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Book Review of Formal Causes:
Definition, Explanation, and
Primacy in Socratic and Aristotelian
Thought. By Michael T. Ferejohn
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Department of Philosophy, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

‘What is it?’ This question is asked in different ways, with a view
to different varieties of answers. Philosophers, especially within the
Western tradition, have taken different varieties of knowledge to be
associated with different ways of answering this question. One kind of
‘what is it?’ question had pride of place among ancient Greek
philosophers: that which seeks to identify those core necessary
features of a thing, attribute, or event by which other regular
necessary features can be explained. The present book is devoted to
what Plato and Aristotle have to say about this sort of account, one
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that identifies what came to be known as the ‘formal cause’. Ferejohn
mostly steers clear of questions concerning the ontological status of
that cause, instead focusing on epistemological questions. How can
one come to be in possession of such an account? What must such an
account include? How is it to be formulated linguistically, and what role
do such formulations play within the context of an explanatory
account? He begins with an account of the centrality of the ‘what is it?’
question to the Socratic elenchus. Special attention is paid to the
Meno’s proposal that epistēmē of a fact rests on an account that works
through the reason why that fact is the case (97d-98b), and the
Euthyphro’s assertion that the sort of account that expresses what a
virtue is will be that which identifies the cause of that virtue, its eidos
(6d). Ferejohn then proceeds to Aristotle’s development of that idea in
the Posterior Analytics, according to which a definition expressing the
‘what is it’ of a regular and necessary feature of the world will play a
crucial role in a demonstration, the sort of account by which that
feature’s cause is identified. Ferejohn traces developments in
Aristotle’s thought: while Aristotle began by emphasizing the role that
definitions play in identifying the formal cause, he comes to believe
that those definitions that express efficient causes play a more crucial
role in scientific and metaphysical explanation. Ferejohn takes this
shift to have its source in tensions already present within the account
of scientific explanation offered in the Posterior Analytics.
Although I am not convinced by the main lines of the story
Ferejohn tells, he asks new, important questions, and opens up new
lines of interpretation well worth careful consideration.
Ferejohn takes as his starting point Aristotle’s recognition of
Socrates as the first to explicitly identify definition as a starting point
of deduction (Meta. i6.987b1-3). Socrates evaluates knowledge claims
on the basis of the presence or absence of certain conditions for
knowledge; he thus qualifies as what Ferejohn calls a ‘grade 1
epistemologist’. Socrates never offers what he takes to be an adequate
definition of knowledge (by which his account would be an instance of
what Ferejohn refers to as ‘grade 2 epistemology’), let alone an
evaluation of competing definitions of knowledge (‘grade 3
epistemology’). The Socratic realization of the centrality of the account
of the ‘what is it’ emerged from the commonsense insight that one
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should know what one is talking about, and developed into the more
precise position that, without knowing what F-ness is, one is unable to
determine the second order properties of F or identify the instances of
F. For example, without knowing what piety is, one knows neither
whether piety is godbeloved, nor which actions or people are pious. A
problem arises, famously raised by Geach: how can one proceed
towards a definition of F, without knowledge that at least some
particulars are F? Ferejohn persuasively argues that the apparent
circle can be avoided. Socrates’ assertion at 71b that if one does not
know the ti esti one cannot know what sort of thing (hopoion) it is
means not that no F can be recognized as such without a definition of
F, but without such a definition, one is not in a position to evaluate the
claims of anything to be an F.
Ferejohn points to Euthyphro 6e as evidence that, for Socrates,
that adequate definition of a virtue is not only necessary, but is also
sufficient for recognizing its instances. Euthyphro 10a-11b extends the
explanatory scope of definitions to second order properties (such as
being beloved by the gods). We begin to see ‘grade 2 epistemology’ in
the Meno: knowledge (epistēmē) is said to require an explanatory
account as it needs to be tied down by a logismos of a reason why
(97d-98b). Definitions, as understood in the Euthyphro (as well as
Meno 72c), will make such explanatory accounts possible.
Ferejohn raises an interesting puzzle. Socrates’ refutation of
actual attempts to define virtues show the inevitable failure of defining
them by appeal to the sorts of behaviors characteristic of the virtuous;
there are so many exceptions and possible cases that any such
definition would take the form of a long disjunction lacking the
requisite unity. Ferejohn argues that this undercuts the diagnostic
function of definitions. For if a virtue is not definable in terms of one’s
behavior, it is to be defined by appeal to the state of soul, which is not
subject to inspection (41-49). To this it can, perhaps, be countered
that Socrates’ prime concern is seeing whether there is virtue within
oneself, not within another. Even if virtue were a purely psychological
state, it might be thought to be visible through some kind of
introspection.

Ancient Philosophy, Vol 35, No. 2 (2015): pg. 458-464. DOI. This article is © Philosophy Documentation Center and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Philosophy Documentation Center
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Philosophy Documentation Center.

3

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

The third chapter is devoted to the structure of Aristotle’s theory
of explanation as initially presented in Posterior Analytics i. It is
perhaps the clearest and most philosophically astute account that this
theory has received. For Ferejohn, the key to understanding book 1 is
to see it as Aristotle’s attempt to work out with sufficient precision and
detail the main lines of the Socratic account of epistēmē. Plato had
said that epistēmē requires tying down one’s belief with an
explanatory account, one that works through the reason why the belief
is true. This is a matter of showing how the belief in question follows
logically from certain beliefs that do not themselves demand such a
logos. For both, the truths that ground such explanation are (at least
in large part) derived from definitions, which express the ‘what is it’ of
the subject of the proposition in question. Aristotle follows Plato in
taking such explanation to serve to show why the belief in question is
necessary. Ferejohn departs from the standard interpretation of this,
that the proposition in question expresses a certain kind of universal
state of affairs, which must be the case. For Ferejohn, what the
demonstration shows is that the truth is certain (for the one who
follows the demonstration), that there is no possibility that one is
wrong in believing that the state of affairs holds. Ferejohn nonetheless
denies that an Aristotelian science is thereby foundationalist in regard
to justification; although they are certain, the premises find warrant in
the coherence of the whole demonstrative scheme with itself and with
the observed facts.
Ferejohn concludes this chapter by turning to Aristotle’s account
of the first principles, the foundations of explanation. As the ultimate
bases of demonstration, first principles must be immediate, not
inferred on the basis of more basic premises. Rather, they are
(somehow) given to one prior to demonstration. One of Aristotle’s own
examples of such an immediate predication is the perceptually
grounded premise that planets do not twinkle (on the basis of which
one can prove that the planets are near; APo. i 3.78a30-38). But the
foundations of explanation must satisfy more than the formal,
extensional criterion of immediacy; they must be maximally
intelligible. For this reason they are to be kath’ hauta (‘catholic’, as
Ferejohn renders it.) Catholic predications must satisfy the intensional
criterion that there is an analytic relation between terms. It is this that
allows them to be explanatorily basic and is the ground for the
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premise’s character as immediate. (To this there is added the
extensional criterion that the terms be coextensive; this ensures that
the demonstration is formulated in such a way that the middle term
reveals the explanatorily relevant feature of the subject term.) In
appealing to analyticity, Ferejohn seems to be suggesting that the
intelligibility of a demonstrative conclusion has its ultimate ground in
use of language, not in the mind’s direct insight into the structure of
reality. But as Ferejohn recognizes, definitions are established and
revised on the basis of their being suitable foundations of explanation.
Accordingly, language itself develops in tandem with the explanatory
accounts of the sciences. The epistemological foundation of
intelligibility is the set of analytic truths expressed in a language, only
when it is suitably reformed and refined.
In APo. ii 11 Aristotle asserts that, although demonstration, as
he conceives it, constitutes an explanation through the identification of
any variety of cause, that through the identification of a formal cause
has pride of place, insofar as definitions, the most important variety of
scientific principle, express the ‘what is it’ or formal cause. But the
canonical model of demonstration, which reveals the formal cause, is
incomplete, for it is unable to account for all of the ultimate premises
of the demonstration of a kath’ hauto property. For example, the
demonstration that all triangles have the sum of their interior angles
equal to two right angles requires a non-definitional premise.
According to Ferejohn, the rest of APo. ii, and the further refinements
and adaptations that Aristotle’s theory of demonstration undergoes in
other, later works indicate that Aristotle recognized that the theory of
demonstration as developed in APo. i is too restrictive. The rest of the
book is devoted to working through developments in Aristotle’s
account of demonstration.
The first non-canonical form of demonstration is that whereby a
demonstrated conclusion is applied to a subgroup of the subject. One
can, for example, easily explain why all isosceles triangles have the
sum of their interior angles equal to two right angles, if it has been
demonstrated that all triangles have this characteristic. While this
would not meet the standards of a canonical demonstration, as the
middle term triangle does not convert with isosceles, the whole
deduction does render the conclusion intelligible, and Ferejohn rightly
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points out that there is no reason to doubt that Aristotle seems willing
to call it a ‘demonstration’ in a loose sense and to grant such
inferences a role in the sciences.
More controversial and philosophically interesting is Ferejohn’s
take on the non-canonical demonstration discussed in ii 8, a variety of
deduction by which a definition can (in a sense) be demonstrated. As
Ferejohn understands it, the demonstration that makes clear the
definition of a (lunar) eclipse shows how a certain occasional variety of
blocking of light is regularly predicated of the moon; that which makes
clear the definition of thunder shows how a certain regular
representative sound is often predicated of clouds. The crucial middle
term here is not going to be derived from the essence of the subject,
as it is in a canonical demonstration. Instead of expressing a formal
cause, the crucial middle term in these cases expresses an efficient
cause. Ferejohn interprets Aristotle’s assertion that this sort of
demonstration is possible when the definiendum ‘has some other
cause’ (APo. ii 8.93a7, ii 9.93b21-8) as drawing a contrast between
the canonical case, in which the middle term is the same as the
subject (insofar as it is definitional of it, and hence is part of its
essence) and that in which the middle term expresses an efficient
cause (which is temporally prior to effects, and is accordingly
something different from it). It is this new understanding of
demonstration that Ferejohn takes to be at work in Aristotle’s later
philosophy of science, in which, on his view, efficient causation comes
to supplant formal causation in both metaphysics and the physical
sciences.
This interpretation is questionable. Had Aristotle wished to
distinguish these sorts of demonstrations as those involving the
efficient cause, he would have said as much; APo. ii 11.94a22 shows
that Aristotle was already clear on the notion of the efficient cause.
Instead, he uses the phrase ‘what has some other cause’. The phrase
is unusual, but it is not the only time it is used. At Meta. v
18.1022a32-35, Aristotle writes that the phrase kath’ hauto is used to
refer to a certain kind of entity, that which does not have a cause
different from itself. His example is ‘human being’: the elements in the
essence of human being are in some sense the cause of a human
being, but insofar as these all express (in an indeterminate way) what
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a human being is, they are not causes other than human beings. The
implication is that any basic subject, with an essence, is that which has
no other cause. It would follow that any characteristic that is not a
basic subject, including properties like having the interior angles equal
to two right angles, would be that which has a cause other than itself.
That this is not a late, anomalous notion is confirmed by a passage in
the Posterior Analytics, in which Aristotle is distinguishing the senses
of the same term under consideration in Meta. v 18: kath’ hauto.
Aristotle says that one sense of kath’ hauto is in reference not to
predications but to things: ‘that which is not said of some other
subject, as, for example, that which is walking is something different,
walking, and white…, but substance, and everything that signifies a
this, is precisely what it is, not being something different’ (APo. i
4.73b5-8). Here the basic subject is what it is kata itself; predicates
like walking or white exist only kata something else. If kata here has
its sense of signifying the cause (Meta. v 18.1022a19-22) as is likely,
Aristotle is referring to the same distinction in ii 8 and 9.
I suggest that what has a cause other than itself, the sort of
entity subject to a demonstration of a definition, is a nonsubstantial
demonstrated predicate, what Aristotle elsewhere calls a kath’ hauto
sumbebēkos. This will include both geometrical properties, such as
having the interior angles equal to two right angles, and the
characteristics of being subject to certain frequent or regularly
occurring predicates, like those discussed in APo. ii 8. I have
elsewhere (Explaining an Eclipse: Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 2.1-10,
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996) worked out how such
demonstrations can be integrated within the demonstrative theory of
APo. i. Ferejohn leaves as a puzzle how the geometrical demonstration
that triangles have two right angles as the sum of their angles fits
within Aristotle’s theory. Insofar as he understands Aristotle to hold
that the sort of demonstration discussed in APo. ii 8 requires filling in
immediate predications (which at 93b13-14 Aristotle calls ‘remaining
reasons’) he expresses puzzlement that Aristotle does not make a
similar point concerning the demonstration that triangles have the sum
of their angles equal to two right angles (143n35); the puzzle
disappears if the two varieties of demonstration are the same.
Likewise, he is puzzled by Aristotle’s apparent assertion that the sort
of demonstration under discussion will reveal the definition of a
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musical concord (147n38): the relevant cause seems to be the formal
cause of mathematical relationships, not the efficient cause of plucking
of the strings. But we can take all of these demonstrations to be of a
single kind. The demonstrated predicate is either predicated of a
complex (a concatenation of simple subjects) or results from the state
in which the efficient cause is in the appropriate relation to the
subject. This eliminates the puzzles, and does not involve reading into
the text distinctions not explicitly made. Further, Ferejohn’s
interpretation does not permit an integrated reading of Aristotle’s
atypically full accounts of demonstration in APo. ii 16 and 17, which
present two ways in which Aristotle sketches an explanatory
demonstration explaining why broad-leafed plants shed their leaves.
On one account, the demonstration has as a middle term the essence
of broad-leafed plants. On the other, the demonstration has as its
middle term the coagulation of the sap at the joint of the leaves, which
Ferejohn takes to be the identification of the efficient cause. Ferejohn
thinks that Aristotle never manages to integrate the two schemes. But,
if it can be shown that broad-leafed plants are the sort of subject that
is regularly subject to said coagulation, the integration would be
straightforward enough. So understood, the full demonstration rests
on the identification of a formal cause, not an efficient cause, except
indirectly. The causal model does not threaten the canonical model, as
Ferejohn says it does; it is rather a special application of it.
Ferejohn makes great hay of the new model of demonstration,
as he understands it. While the canonical model of demonstration is
based on a Platonic point of view, according to which making sense of
the world is a matter of revealing stable relations among essences,
demonstration as later conceived by Aristotle is suited towards a more
dynamic account of reality. Physical explanations appeal to nature,
which is a cluster of capacities, not an essence or form. How then do
we interpret Aristotle’s assertion that nature is first and foremost form
(Phys. ii 1.193b7-12)? Is form here primarily an efficient cause, not a
formal cause?
Ferejohn concludes the book with a brief foray into the waters of
Metaphysics vii. Aristotle’s task is to understand substances by asking
the ‘what is it’ question of substance itself. Book 7 on his account
mirrors the story line he discerns in the development of Aristotle’s
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account of explanation. Metaphysics vii 1-4 seek the cause of
substance in substantial essence, which is the same as substance.
Such a strategy is unable to account for those features of a substance
that emerge in time through the actualization of the potentialities
inherent in matter. However, the introduction of matter in an account
of what substance is threatens the unity of substance, as it is now
understood as form plus matter. What Ferejohn takes to be Aristotle’s
definitive account of substance is presented in the fresh start of vii 17.
The cause of substance responsible for its unity is form considered as
the efficient cause of the coming to be of the composite. The question
of the logical unity of substance is transformed into a question of
natural science: how exactly is it that a formal element shapes and
directs matter to allow it to become a substance of a certain kind?
The story line of book 7 that Ferejohn presents is somewhat
schematic, as the scope of his book does not permit the sort of close
analysis that dominates most treatments of book 7. Nonetheless, the
general account he gives is plausible, and has the benefit of being
supported by a new and creative account of the structure of the sorts
of demonstrations to which Aristotle appeals in vii 17. It stands even
without the support of the new interpretation of the role of efficient
causation in the demonstrative theory of the Posterior Analytics.
Ferejohn has devoted much of his career to shedding much
needed light on Aristotle’s epistemology and philosophy of science;
Formal Causes continues the project. The first part, which takes
Aristotle’s thought on these matters to be a direct and self-conscious
furthering of Socratic methodology, can be recommended without
reservation. Its account of the fundamental strategy and purpose of
the Posterior Analytics is among the best introductions to this work. I
find much of the second part unconvincing, but the history of the
interpretation of APo. ii 8-10 shows that it is very unlikely that any line
of interpretation of these important and difficult chapters will ever
meet universal approval. Ferejohn successfully leads us to ask new
questions and the interpretative strategies he works through will
surely be included among the main options.
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